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Abstract 
The notion of ‘integration’ in the context of health information systems is ill-defined yet in 
wide-spread use. We identify a variety of meanings spanning from purely technical 
integration of information systems to integration of services. This ambiguity (or interpretative 
flexibility), we argue, is inherent rather accidental: it a necessary prerequisite for mobilising 
political and ideological support among stakeholders for integrated health information 
systems. Building on this, our aim is to trace out the career dynamics of the vision of 
‘integration/ integrated’. The career dynamics is the transformation of both the imagery and 
material (technological) realisations of the unfolding implementation of the vision of 
integrated care. Empirically we draw on a large, ongoing project at the University hospital of 
North Norway (UNN) to establish an integrated health information system. 
Keywords Visions, integration, implementation, case study 
1. Introduction 
The health care sectors in all Western countries are profoundly fragmented. They are 
fragmented across geographical, professional, organisational and technical boundaries.  This 
creates a fragmented health care service for the patients (SHD, 2007; Boochever, 2004), 
which undermine efforts of transforming organizations towards more collaborative, process-
oriented modes of working (Broadbent et al., 1999; Scott-Morton, 1991). Ultimately, this 
threatens ongoing efforts to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery. 
This generates the very understandable motivation for notions like ‘continuity of care’, 
‘shared care’ or ‘integrated care’. ‘Integration’ is a potential remedy for problems 
fragmentation produce, i.e. duplication, non-consistency and redundancy. To appreciate the 
importance of integrated information systems, Davenport (1998:127) explains, we “need to 
understand the problem [they] are designed to solve: the fragmentation of information in large 
…organizations”. Visions of ‘integrated care’ are attractive exactly because they promise a 
solution to these concerns including efficiency gains and quality improvements.  
Despite its common use and perceived attractiveness, however, the qualifier ‘integration/ 
integrated’ in the context of information systems remains notoriously slippery as “individuals 
often have a different understanding of the meaning of the word” (Gulledge, 2006:5). It marks 
the political and ideological commitment towards integrated care, i.e. service integration as 
experienced by individual patients. On the other hand, it is simultaneously used in the much 
narrower sense of the technical integration of relevant clinical information systems. 
We describe the distinct meanings of the qualifier ‘integrated/ integration’ in relation to health 
information systems and analyse its ambiguity. We argue that the implementation process of 
integrated systems in health care rely on the ambiguous meaning of ‘integration’ i.e. 
necessary support for the project is due to, not despite, the ambiguous meaning of 
‘integration’. Identifying ambiguity – the interpretative flexibility whereby different actors or 
stakeholders ascribe distinct meanings to an artefact or concept – should hardly surprise 
anyone. Our ambition is to go beyond the mere recording of this ambiguity. The principal aim 
of this paper is to analyse the career or sequence of transformations the vision of integrated 
health information systems undergo as it interacts with the intended as well as unintended 
consequences of its implementation. In other words, we analyse the reciprocal transformations 
over time of the vision of integrated care and its material (attempted) realisations among 
involved stakeholders. 
Empirically we draw on a large, ongoing project at the University hospital of North Norway 
(UNN) to establish an integrated health information system. Born out of increasing 
impatience and frustration with the exiting fragmented portfolio, consisting of an electronic 
patient record system (EPR) (which we dub RecSys), radiology-system (RIS), patient 
administrative system (PAS) and a fair share of the laboratory-systems all provided by 
different vendors, the intention was to replace this, non-integrated portfolio with a tightly 
integrated package from one vendor which we refer to as HealthSys. 
2. Conceptualising integration in health care: visions and 
technologies 
 
Policy documents on Norwegian, not unlike other European, health sector reforms, rely 
heavily on ICT to meet the serious challenges for increased efficiency, effectivness and 
improved quality of the whole value chain of health care services. Integration, a key policy 
document argues, implies that all relevant information would be always available:  
“The health care worker becomes more available because all information is accessible 
regardless of where the health care worker and patient are” (SHD, 2001) 
It goes on to illustrate how integration facilitates the creation of a health service virtual market 
where: 
“In the future there will probably be an increase of services in ‘networks’ where 
bidders can present services [for example on the internet] and those who want, for 
instance referral physicians, can search for services, check capacity and, if possible, 
make bookings. [Accordingly] the network will be a trading place” SHD (2001). 
In the most recent  policy document from the Norwegian directorate for Social and Health 
affairs, the crucial role of integrated information systems to achieve integrated (or continuity 
of) care is emphasised: 
“The aim is that patients and clients shall experience continuity of care when they use 
the [health] services. Electronic interaction is decisive in order to ensure the free flow 
of information” (SHD, 2007:5) 
Even this small sample of the meanings of the vision of ‘integration’ in the health care sector 
demonstrates its varied meanings, thus ambiguity: flexible access of information, creation of 
virtual markets of services with their consumption or continuity of care.  
Rather than being surprised or confused by this, we need to recognise that the ambiguity over 
the exact meaning of ‘integrated care’ is typical for all visions. A characteristic, not to say 
constitutive, feature of visions are their ambiguity. A highly relevant analysis of this aspect of 
visions is Swanson and Ramiller (1997) who introduce the notion of ‘organizing vision’. 
Swanson and Ramiller (ibid.) explain the productive roles the ambiguity of effective visions 
play. A key part of a vision is to reduce uncertainty during planning and decision making. 
They underscore the vision’s ability to provide multiple interpretation and “institutional 
coherence to initiatives” (ibid: 460). More interestingly, they move beyond simply 
recognising the ambiguity of visions. They point out the necessity of visions to evolve over 
time in such a way as to ensure legitimacy and: 
“An organizing vision often grounds the legitimation of the [vision] in broader 
business concerns, linking the innovation to aspects of business functioning that are 
currently of prominent interest.” (ibid: 461). 
Finally, the organising vision serves to mobilise the necessary resources to support the 
realisation of the vision as it serves to “activate, motivate, and structure…the innovation 
(ibid:461). 
It is vital to note that the vision do transform; it is not just a question of forging an alliance 
(legitimation, mobilisation) of different meanings or interpretations. This aspect of a vision is 
highlighted in Knorr Cetina’s (2001: 182) notion of ‘epistemic object’ and their “changing, 
unfolding character – or [their] lack of ‘object-ivity’ and completeness of being”. Epistemic 
objects or visions are thus not objects of which we have complete, potentially diverging, 
knowledge; they are essentially incomplete and discovered over time in interaction with 
practice. 
So much for visions. Let us turn to an outline of technical manifestations and realisations in 
health care of integrated care.The integration of healthcare software systems has remained one 
of the most prominent issues in healthcare software development (Xu et al., 2000:157; 
Mykkänen, 2003:173; Kuhn and Giuse, 2001). Boochever (2004:16), for instance, 
underscores that “system integration would provide the platform for improved workflow, 
patient throughput and patient safety, as well as decreased cost”. 
An integrated solution is supposed to give the physicians easy access to data from multiple 
information sources (Winsten, 2000; Friedman, 2001:1529; Tsiknakis et al., 2002:6), thus 
providing a complete picture of the patient/client’s medical history. The multiple information 
sources are accessed seamlessly from a single point of end-user interaction (Boochever, 
2004:16). This avoids that the physician must perform redundant activities, such as specifying 
the patient identifying information over and over again (Ginneken, 2002:101; Tsiknakis et al., 
2002).  
The literature on integration of information systems is heavily dominated by presentations of 
technical mechanisms for integration as solutions for the earlier described problems of 
fragmentation. There does exist, however, critical voices to the one-sidedness of the above 
position on integration. Goodhue et al. (1992) have called for a more nuanced approach to 
integration. Working out a pragmatically based contingency model, they identify conditions 
under which they argue that the costs (in terms of loss of flexibility, increase in development 
costs) may outweigh the benefits of integration. Similarly, and more recently, Singletary 
(2004) surveys practitioners’ perceptions of downsides to integration including lock-in with 
vendors, costs and project risks (see also Markus, 2001). Empirically underpinned case 
studies (see e.g. Hanseth et al., 2006; Rolland and Monteiro, 2007; Perrow, 1984); 
demonstrate in more detail the form and implications of the unintended consequences of 
integration.  
3. Method 
The case study has been conducted at the University Hospital of North Norway (UNN) during 
January 2004 – May 2005, and has after that been followed up by informal contacts 
throughout 2006. UNN has approximately 5000 employees, including 450 physicians and 
1000 nurses. The hospital has 600 beds of which 450 are somatic and 150 psychiatric. 
Together with 10 smaller hospitals in North Norway, UNN is administrated by the regional 
health enterprise Health Region North. Health Region North is responsible for a regional 
health policy in the northern region, a sound economy and coordination of activities among 
the 11 hospitals. The health enterprise has also identified information technology as a 
strategic area, especially related to standardised systems across the hospitals in the region. 
In addition to the clinical departments, UNN has 7 laboratories: Clinical Chemistry, 
Microbiology, Pathology, Clinical pharmacology, Immunology, blood bank and Medical 
genetics. Together, these laboratories conduct approximately 3 million analyses a year. 
Clinical Chemistry is the absolutely largest of the laboratories (using number of analyses as a 
measure), conducting nearly 2 million analyses a year.  
The study belongs to an interpretive research approach (Klein and Myers, 1999; Walsham, 
1993) and includes participant observations, interviews, document analysis, and informal 
discussions. The data collection, conducted by the first author, is presented in the table below: 
Participant 
observations 
Participation in 60 project meetings in the HealthSys project from its 
initial stages (January, 2004) and onwards. This has also resulted 
in a 70 transcribed documents. 
The project members participating in these meetings were IT-
consultants, physicians, secretaries, bioengineers and nurses. Their 
number varied from 5 to 16. 
Informal talks 50 notes based on informal talks with participants in the HealthSys 
project and users. 
Interviews 12 open-ended interviews with a tape recorder of users of whom 
eight where physicians. 
Document archive 500 emails sent to the HealthSys project and the project document-
archive consisting of several 100 documents 
Table 1 The data collection 
The analysis of the data is based on a hermeneutic approach where a complex whole is 
understood “from preconceptions about the meanings of its parts and their interrelationships” 
(Klein and Myers, 1999:71). This implies that the different sources of field data are all taken 
into consideration in the interpretation process. The method included relatively detailed case 
write-ups for the sites involved (see for instance Eisenhardt (1989)) followed by an 
examination of the data for potential analytical themes. Emerging patterns from the data 
(Schultze, 2000) were attempted categorised to themes in order to make good overviews 
based on the perspectives chosen. This process was repeated, also involving new theoretical 
insight.  
4. Case narrative from the University hospital in Northern 
Norway 
The University Hospital of Northern Norway (UNN) participated for almost eight years in the 
national and longstanding Medakis project (1996-2003). This project started out as an 
ambitious, collaborative project between the five Norwegian university hospitals and an 
international vendor with considerable financial and political backing from the health 
authorities. The overall goal was to develop a common, all-encompassing EPR for these 
hospitals covering the needs of all the different health professions in different hospital 
departments (Ellingsen and Monteiro, 2003). Despite falling significantly short of these 
expectations, the RecSys EPR has been in operational, increasingly wide-spread, use in the 
five university hospitals for several years.  
The key role of EPRs in Norwegian health care is reiterated regularly in health policy 
programmes (SHD 1996, 2001). This, however, has not been sufficient to coordinate an 
integrated and uniform health care. A sweeping health reform in 2002 shifted the ownership 
of the Norwegian hospitals from the counties over to the Government in an attempt to curb 
expenditures and poor exploitation of existing resources. The former five health regions were 
replaced by five regional health enterprises with substantial autonomy, each comprising one 
of the former university hospitals and several local hospitals.  
Increasingly, the users at UNN (especially the physicians), were dissatisfied with the RecSys 
EPR portfolio. In daily work, they depended on having access to x-ray-descriptions, 
laboratory results and the EPR. A lack of mutual integration between PAS, EPR and 
laboratory systems made this situation extremely cumbersome. 
The Regional Health Enterprise Northern Norway (here referred to as Health Region North), 
in a surprising decision in December 2003, exercised its newly gained autonomy to break out 
of the long-term Medakis collaborative effort. UNN was the only hospital in the northern 
health region running RecSys EPR, and Health Region North decided to replace this with 
what the ten other (smaller) hospitals in the region had, namely systems from the vendor 
HealthSys. To change this was argued to be “obvious”. The users perceived RecSys EPR as 
largely a standalone application. In contrast, HealthSys could presumably offer a complete 
package including (RIS, PAS, EPR, Laboratory-system and psychiatry). HealthSys promotes 
their different modules as a complete and integrated solution: 
“The HealthSys solution is based on a common architecture, integrated modules and a 
common logon-procedure across the different modules.” 
The HealthSys modules resided in the same database, implying that some registers in the 
database are shared between the modules. The HealthSys is one out of three vendors on the 
Norwegian hospital-based EPR market. HealthSys enjoys a 30% market share, mostly at 
smaller hospitals (Lærum, Ellingsen and Faxvaag, 2001). The HealthSys EPR module comes 
integrated with a Radiology module, Laboratory module, PAS module and a Psychiatry 
module.  
Health Region North supported the project of replacing RecSys EPR with HealthSys with 10 
MNOK (about 1,2 MEUR). Beyond that, UNN was assumed to provide necessary personnel 
resources. In January 2004, UNN established an implementation group consisting of 
personnel from UNN and HealthSys.  
However, although the HealthSys -system had been successful in the smaller hospitals, the 
project-group was aware of the risk associated with an IT-project implemented at the region’s 
large university hospital. The project manager underscored that, ‘we are about to run a 
system, which has never been run on this scale before’. A strategy to reduce the risk 
connected to scale was to tone down the ambition level and just see the implementation of the 
HealthSys portfolio as just a substitution of the existing hospital portfolio, thus avoiding large 
organisational changes. 
 “No new functionality will be put into use (…) we shall only replace the current PAS 
and EPR with the HealthSys system (…) there will be no new design of work 
processes in this phase” (IT-leader). 
In spite of this pronounced modest strategy, it was clear to the top management inn UNN that 
some changes to work- processes were unavoidable, especially in the laboratories. The 
laboratory module in HealthSys required considerable development in order to provide a 
satisfactory support for the laboratory work tasks. This was especially a key concern for the 
Microbiology laboratory. In any case it was seen as crucial to enrol the laboratory in the 
implementation process both since as many as possible should run a common system an also 
since this would be the cheapest alternative: 
“A lot of development remains for the Microbiology laboratory (...) but we have to keep 
on to the vision … and therefore the laboratory must perhaps in a period accept a poorer 
solution than what they have today” (Hospital manager, SMS) 
In addition to the risk of scale, existing integrations were identified as another complication. 
The old PAS system had over several years been integrated with an increasing amount of 
smaller systems in the hospital. Completely replacing the old PAS as a big-bang solution was 
thus considered an extremely risky business as many of the existing systems would stop 
working as they especially depended on functionality provided by the old PAS-system 
(searching patients, reimbursement functionality, different codes, reports etc). The HealthSys 
project experienced that it was difficult to obtain a complete overview over the status of these 
integrations. The project leader for the technical team put it like this: 
“All those smaller systems imply a chaotic situation. And we don’t know who has 
made the integration, what is integrated and how things are integrated. Moreover we 
don’t know how much [of this functionality] that is actually in use”. 
As an alternative strategy, it was decided that the old PAS should be kept “alive” side by side 
with the PAS module in HealthSys. In such a way, all the other systems could be left 
untouched. It was clearly pointed out that this was just a temporary solution as the IT-leader 
underscored that ‘the old PAS will be shut down at the end of 2005’.  
By June 2004, the EPR and the PAS module were implemented. The implementation of 
laboratory module followed in December 2004.  
5. Analysis 
In the context of health care, the notion of integration has a deeply ambiguous meaning. 
Moving beyond merely identifying an ambiguity around the notion, the purpose of our 
analysis is to trace out the career of the vision as played out in the empirical setting under 
study. 
Leaning on the ‘career dynamics of organizing visions’ (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), we 
explore the history of visions on integration in health care, how it transforms in different 
contexts, but most essentially over time. We focus on how the vision for integrated health 
information systems – as a result of changes in policy documents, problems and unintended 
effects surfacing during implementation – go through a career, i.e. it undergoes a sequence of 
transformations. Our analysis is structured to highlight three sequences or phases of the 
vision’s career. Table 2 summaries this. 
Phase Notion of 
integration 
Illustration 
Early  One standardised 
system 
“There are 11 hospitals in this region and 10 running the 
HealthSys portfolio; therefore it is obvious that also UNN 
should run it”  
Middle  Single sign-on “I have three different logon-codes that I have to use on 
three different systems”  
Late  Regionalisation of 
services 
“We want to establish shared laboratory services (…) and 
include similar laboratory functions in common regional 
units”  
 
Table 2 The career of the vision of integrated health information systems across three sequences or phases 
is summarised. 
5.1 Early phase (2003 – 2004): Before ‘integration’ 
Initially, Health Region North translated the Health authorities’ visions of free flow of 
information, seamlessness and continuity of care into ambitions of a uniform IT portfolio in 
the northern health region. Basically, this boiled down to insisting that all hospitals in the 
region should have the same applications for each of its functional areas:  
“Within the area of clinical IS support, the strategy for Health Region North is to 
implement of common, scalable and standard solutions” (Health Region North IT 
strategy, 2002:29). 
“Clinical results shall be managed in common EPR/PAS systems (…) available for 
several hospitals and actors in the healthcare sector” (ibid: 2002:28) 
Health Region North’s ambition was caused by an existing topography in North Norway of 11 
hospitals whereof 10 were running the HealthSys system. UNN was the only one not running 
it. To standardise the IT portfolio into one common system was therefore considered 
common-sense “obvious”, thus black-boxing the issue into an invincible argument (Latour, 
1999): 
“There are 11 hospitals in this region and 10 running the HealthSys portfolio; 
therefore it is obvious that also UNN should run it” (IT manager, Health Region 
North) 
With that, Health Region North evoked the HealthSys system as an appropriate technology 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997:467) for the task.  
For Health Region North, a shared regional system meant that upgrades, user requests and 
general database management could be streamlined and centralised, subsequently followed by 
significant reduction in expenditures. Health Region North thus grounded the legitimating of a 
standardised system in broader business concerns of economy and efficiency (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997:461). In line with well-rehearsed arguments for economy of scale, integration 
qua standardisation of clinical applications was to ensure efficiency gains. 
A shared regional system would also legitimize a reorganisation and standardisation of the IT 
operation procedures. Each of the hospitals had their own associated IT department, which 
was, according to Health Region North, causing unnecessary expenditures. Implementing one 
standardised HealthSys system would make it perfectly relevant to also make one regional IT 
department.  
Consequently, a regional IT department (Health Region North ICT), was created in January 
2006. The former IT departments in each of the hospitals were decoupled from the hospitals, 
merged into this common regional IT department consisting of 126 employees. Health Region 
North ICT is organised directly been under Health Region North control and administration. 
Key intentions with this establishment were: 
“To contribute to an efficient ICT management through regionalisation (…) it is 
estimated a minimum profit on 5-10 % in a medium term view, approximately 2-3 
years” (Ernst & Young, 2005). 
However, the materialisation of the regional IT department really did not fulfil the 
expectations, at least not in the short term. Bureaucratizing, new expenses and separation 
from the clinic have been a consequence. An IT-manager at the new IT department expressed 
it like this: 
“Right now I don’t know when the expected efficiency gains might come. In fact, it is 
more expensive now. Since the IT department is dispersed geographically, we use a lot 
of resources in reorganisation and coordinating activities across the different locations 
together with increased expensive flight expenses” 
“Nobody thought about the new expenses related to homogenisation of the 
infrastructure Right now we have got 100 million NOK to the platform project 
[common infrastructure]. But we should rather have been funded with 300 mill when 
the new department was started.   
Still, the biggest challenge is definitely the separation from the users, caused by separate 
organisations: 
 “The establishment of an IT department outside the hospitals has caused a big gap 
between us and them … we don’t have the same access to the users in the clinic as 
before … now there is a border. To some extent … as I see it, the hospitals have 
forgotten that we are the same people as before when we were part of their 
organisation … it has been a tough divorce. What’s more, the regional IT department 
represents a new legal organisation, meaning that we must have personnel both among 
us (key account managers) and in the hospitals that negotiate contracts and service 
level. This is extremely resource demanding.  
5.2 Middle phase (2004 – 2005): Integration at the hospital 
At UNN, the visions of integration were basically interpreted as “single sign-on”. The 
physicians in the clinic were dissatisfied with their existing IT-portfolio. In daily work, they 
depended on having access to x-ray-descriptions, laboratory results and the EPR. A lack of 
mutual integration of their existing PAS, EPR and laboratory systems made this situation 
difficult as a physician phrases it: 
“I don’t have the laboratory results; I don’t have the x-ray-description. Instead I have 
three different logon-codes that I have to use on three different systems [RecSys EPR, 
Laboratory and RIS] and I have to leave and enter the different systems in turn” 
(Physician) 
HealthSys could presumably offer a complete package including (RIS, PAS, EPR, 
Laboratory-system and psychiatry). HealthSys promotes their modules as a complete and 
integrated solution. Implementing the HealthSys portfolio would imply that the users would 
have to relate to only one system, one interface and one logon procedure: 
“The HealthSys solution is based on a common architecture, integrated modules and a 
common logon-procedure across the different modules.” 
Accordingly, when presenting the HealthSys system for the UNN users, the project group 
traded on the vision’s interpretive flexibility (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997:464) and tailored 
the definition of the HealthSys system exactly to the needs of the users in the clinic – an 
integrated system with single sign-on. This served to mobilise the physicians at UNN very 
easily as their most pressing problem would be solved.  
The HealthSys portfolio was envisioned as a completely integrated solution for the users. It is 
timely to inquire for whom the resulting work routines became easier – and for whom they 
implied additional work. The HealthSys system eased the work for the physicians in the 
clinic, but simultaneously – and unexpectedly – additional work was distributed to the users in 
the laboratories. The reason for this was that the laboratory users did not use the HealthSys 
portfolio, and therefore they had to maintain the “integrated solution” partially manually. 
The reason for this was that, during and after the implementation, the old PAS was kept 
“alive” side by side with the PAS module in HealthSys in order to leave all other systems 
untouched (see figure 2). This strategy required technical integration between the old PAS 
and HealthSys PAS to maintain the existing information flow and to uniquely identifying 
patients across these systems. The IT department developed a gateway-program which 
tracked changes in the HealthSys PAS. Whenever new patients were inserted into the 
HealthSys system or other changes were made on patient information, this was synchronised 
with the old PAS. 
 
Figure 2.  The Gateway machine connecting the new HealthSys portfolio with the old portfolio, via the old 
PAS.  
However, this caused additional work for many of the users in the laboratories, as they still 
used the the old IT portfolio. When a user wanted to create a new sample in one of the old 
laboratory systems she had first to ensure that the patient existed in the old PAS. First, she had 
to search for the patient in the old PAS. If this proved futile, which regularly was the case, she 
would have to log onto the HealthSys system to enter the patient, then wait until the gateway-
machine had synchronised patient information with the old PAS. This would easily take 3-4 
minutes. Then, finally, she could access the patient in the laboratory system (through its 
integration with the old PAS). 
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A smooth information flow between the old IT-portfolio and the HealthSys portfolio was 
extremely dependent of an up-and-running gateway-machine. However, sometimes the 
gateway-machine failed to synchronise patients, either because the program had stopped due 
to system failure or unexpected other reasons, for instance, due to lacking or incomplete data 
fields. Accordingly, in some situations, when the users had inserted a new patient into the 
HealthSys system, the patient was never synchronised with the old PAS. At one instance, a 
laboratory user called the IT-department and complained that she had waited for 2 hours for 
the synchronisation. In such cases, the users had no choice, but to insert the patients in the old 
PAS anyway. The synchronisation would eventually become complete when the gateway 
machine was up and running again and could replace the demographic data written into PAS 
with data written into the HealthSys system. 
In sum, the notion of integration did not imply free flow of information and single sign-on for 
everybody: predominantly the physicians enjoyed this. In contrast, the laboratory personnel 
had to do additional work to ensure that the users in the clinic got a complete integrated 
system. Moreover, the laboratory personnel had to work closely with the IT department, 
which continuously had to monitor their ad-hoc integration enabled by the improvised 
gateway machine. Thus, for the laboratories and the IT department, integration became 
improvisation, monitoring and repair-work (see Ellingsen and Monteiro, 2006 for a more 
elaborate analysis). 
5.3 Late phase (2005 – 2007): Regionalised integration 
Recently, integration has become embedded in broader political restructuring of Norwegian 
health care into a stronger regionalisation of services. The notion of integration has thus 
moved beyond only connecting technical systems to also include coordinated services. As 
illustrated by Chesbrough and Spohrer (2006) in their research manifesto for services science, 
integration is now recast into abstract production and consumption of ‘services’:  
“How can this information of the capabilities of artefacts and organizations be 
recombined and accelerated in its velocity to create value? How can it be integrated in 
context to create new and valued services and solutions to customer problems?” 
(ibid:39) 
 The vision of coordinated services was picked up by the management of Health Region North 
to focus on how services should be integrated on a regional level. Practically this has meant 
trying to implement organisational flexibility and absorbing workload peaks, common bid for 
tender and standardisation of services. In particular, however, there has been an increased 
interest in streamlining the laboratory services. Health Region wants a close coordination 
among the laboratories in the health region, both organisationally and technically. 
Organisationally, this implies sharing functions, such as a common automated front-end to the 
laboratories and the inclusion of similar laboratory functions in common organisational units, 
such as Blood bank North, Clinical Chemistry North and Microbiology North. Technically, 
this implies to establish common laboratory systems  for the hospitals in the region.  
However, things did not turn out as expected. When introducing the integrated HealthSys 
system, the laboratories were expected to replace their systems with the common HealthSys 
laboratory module in order to comply to ensure tight integration with the rest of HealthSys 
modules. For the Clinical Chemistry, Immunology and Clinical Pharmacology laboratories, 
this was an unquestionable argument, thus being in line with Health Region North’s ambition 
on shared services in the health region. The pressure for integration – implying a 
corresponding pressure for standardisation in the sense of uniformity - was (as we have 
elaborate on above) embedded in the strategic intentions of Health Region North:  
 “For (…) blood bank, pathology and Microbiology we want the same systems and 
preferably in the same database for each specialised discipline in the whole region” 
(Director, Health Region North). 
The HealthSys laboratory module was up and running for the Clinical Chemistry, 
Immunology and Clinical Pharmacology laboratories in November 2004. However, the 
Microbiology laboratory refused to implement the HealthSys laboratory module even if 
HealthSys promised to put in considerable resources into improving the laboratory module. 
Despite having a really outdated, existing system, the Microbiology laboratory argued that 
their complex work routines differed so much from the others. They argued that the HealthSys 
laboratory module was tailored for simplicity, thus tailored to Clinical Chemistry:  
“The problem is that every vendor making laboratory systems starts out where the 
production is most intensive and that means Clinical Chemistry, but the problem is that 
Clinical Chemistry has an incredible simple data structure” (Physician, Microbiology 
laboratory). 
The process inside the Microbiology laboratory is much more complex involving collecting 
information from various information sources, thus generating highly contextual information. 
In the HealthSys laboratory module, this information was either missing (for example 
registers for non-human samples, material, location and antibiotics) or dispersed throughout 
the system: 
‘‘In the HealthSys module, generally, the information that we need is very much 
dispersed in different screens and folders. This requires a lot of clicks orientation and 
manoeuvres to group things together, such as which bowl, which colony [cultivating] 
and where the result comes from as traceability is extremely important’’ (Physician, 
Microbiology laboratory) 
Accordingly, the ambition of a full-scale regional integrated service for the laboratories has 
not been possible to obtain. 
6. Conclusion 
Integration in health care is a compelling yet ill-defined notion. This lack of clarity is not 
accidental, we argue, as ‘integration’ should be recognised more as a forceful vision 
(Pfaffenberger, 1998; Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) than a readily definable notion. 
A constitutive aspect of visions is their ambiguity. Visions are effective, i.e. able to organise 
and mobilise political backing, exactly because they allow multiple interpretations. The open-
ended nature of integrated system implies that images and metaphors play a particularly 
productive role as a powerful ally (Boland and Greenberg 1992) for different stakeholders, 
when implementing instances of the visions. 
More importantly than merely noting the ambiguity (or interpretative flexibility), visions qua 
epistemic objects (Knorr Cetina 2001) are essentially incomplete: they are discovered, 
changed and extended continuously throughout implementation. This is in part due to the 
accompanying negotiation among stakeholders, and in part due to the gradual uncovering of 
new consequences – some intended, others not – over time. 
We draw the following implication.  The characteristic, ongoing transformations point to the 
futility of pursuing a completely integrated portfolio as the vision most probably has changed 
before this stage is ever reached. Instead, stakeholders planning and commissioning 
integration effort need to be prepared to refocus their efforts in tandem with how the vision 
changes in order to exercise some influence on how the vision is shaped. We also believe that 
broad rather than narrow technical evaluations of integration efforts should be conducted. It is 
not sufficient to evaluate particular instances of integration. Rather, integration needs to be 
evaluated as a part of a larger career of implementations and transformations in order to get 
the whole picture of where vision has come from and where it is going. 
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